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Abstract
The diversionary theory of war has been considered one of the most
contested theories that link domestic and external conflicts. Thus far
scholarship in this field has focused on one-time single diversionary
attacks, which led to the temporary deflection of attention from domestic
problems to external ones. This study intends to bring revisions to the
assumptions in the center of diversionary theory and demonstrate these
through a well-known but underutilized case. This article intends to show
that leaders have not one single option but rather a repertoire of
different foreign policy actions in their possession to divert the attention
of domestic public. In addition to the use of force, leaders can also use
the threat to use force and other less violent means to create a rally
round the flag effect. Secondly, this study will show that, unlike the
presumptions of the previous studies, leaders can use multiple different
diversionary strategies within a short period of time if the initial
diversionary action does not create intended outcomes and if they are
still willing to use externalization to boost his approval rating and divert
public attention from present problems. These two contributions to the
theory will be demonstrated in the case of Saddam Hussein’s attacks to
Kuwait and Israel during the first Gulf War.
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Introduction 
For many years, scholars debated whether the diversionary motivations of political leaders could 
be a source of international conflict and warfare, and whether leaders dealing with domestic 
crises could resort to the use of force against external threats in order to distract the attention of 
the domestic public. This diversionary theory of war has frequently been suggested by opposition 
parties and some journalists after a leader uses force or escalates tensions against another 
country, particularly when the opposition feels that the action is not related to national security 
concerns.  
 
This study aims to contribute to the debate on the diversionary theory of war by focusing on the 
use of this strategy by a non-American and non-democratic leader. The study will show that 
leaders can use diversionary actions short of war in addition to the use of force, and may even 
employ multiple forms of these strategies when they require some source of distraction to 
temporarily relieve themselves of domestic pressures. The article is divided into three main parts: 
the first will summarize the development of the diversionary theory of war; the second will focus 
on proposed revisions in the scholarship; and the third will provide the application of the 
theoretical revisions to a particular case study, namely Saddam Hussein’s aggressive foreign 
policy against multiple countries during the Gulf Crisis.  
 
Diversionary Theory of War 
Diversionary theory of war is one of the most controversial theories of foreign policy. In its 
simplest form, the theory states that leaders who are facing certain domestic economic, political, 
and social problems at home, and who do not have immediate solutions for these problems, 
resort to a strategy of distracting the attention of the public away from these domestic problems 
to provide temporary relief.1 In most instances, the distraction succeeds when the public stops 
focusing on domestic problems and instead focuses on foreign policy. The primary motivation 
behind such an endeavor is what is sociologically known as the in-group/out-group mechanism, 
meaning that a conflict with an out-group usually unites the members of a particular group. 
Sociologists such as Simmel and Coser provided a systemic explanation of this mechanism in 
their studies and asserted, “war with the outside is sometimes the last chance for a state ridden 
with inner antagonisms to overcome these antagonisms, or else to break up definitely.”2 In fact, it 
was argued that a political leader’s feelings of insecurity about his political survival may provoke 
his starting hostilities with an external group in order to trigger a rally effect within his own 
group and bolster support.3  
 
Early systemic studies of diversionary theory of war took place in the 1960s and 1970s. 
However, scholars of international studies reached contradictory results about the link between 
domestic problems and external conflict. For instance, quantitative studies conducted during this 
period—to determine if there were any diversionary motivations on the part of leaders who 
                                                          
1
 Levy, in his review of the literature defined the theory as the “idea that political elites often embark on adventurous 
foreign policies or even resort to war in order to distract popular attention away from internal social and economic 
problems and consolidate their own domestic political support.” Levy, Jack S., “Diversionary Theory of War: A 
Critique,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (London: Unwin-Hyman, 1989), 259. 
2
 Simmel, George, Conflict (Glencoe: Free, 1955).  
3
 Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson, Causes of War (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).  
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launched military strikes and engaged in armed conflicts with other countries—failed to reach a 
substantive conclusion and, in some cases, argued that there was no meaningful link between 
domestic and external conflicts at all.4 However, other sociological findings and anecdotal 
knowledge in the field were contradictory to the findings of these studies. For example, some 
scholars stated that, “it appears to be a general law that human groups react to external pressure 
by increased coherence” and thus, “statesmen may be driven to a policy of foreign conflict—if 
not open war—in order to defend themselves against the onslaught of domestic enemies.”5  
 
The dominant systemic determinants of external relations of nations during the Cold War years 
did not allow theories that focused on domestic determinants of foreign policy to flourish. 
However, in the last years of the Cold War, several studies began to focus on the diversionary 
theory of war in a more systematic fashion. One of the most significant challenges of the 
predominance of neorealist theories came from the works of Ostrom and Job. In their study, they 
found that, compared to some domestic factors, international factors were less important with 
regard to presidential use of force.6 This meant that while giving a decision to use force against 
external others, leaders could be much more influenced by their approval ratings within the 
country than by other more systemic and external factors. Ostrom and Job’s study not only 
created a major debate regarding domestic versus external sources of presidential use of force, 
but also launched an almost separate field that focused on the use of force by American 
presidents. Due to several practical advantages of focusing on United States (U.S.) presidents—
including availability of data and relative frequency of using force, especially during the terms of 
President Bush and President Clinton—diversionary studies began to revolve around the use of 
force by U.S. presidents. Throughout the 1990s, a scholarly conversation on diversionary theory 
of war emerged, thanks to the contribution of scholars such as James and Hristoulas, Lian and 
O’Neal, DeRouen,and DeRouen and Peake, the majority of which focused on presidential uses of 
force.7 In later years, during the post-September 11th era, the debate on presidential use of force 
focused more on external determinants, such as global terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction. During this period, scholarly conversation on the diversionary theory of war evolved 
around methodology and data, and studies focusing on diversionary uses of force by other world 
leaders began to emerge.  
 
                                                          
4
 For some of the contradictory findings regarding the diversionary motivation of political leaders, see: Burrowes, 
Robert and Bert Spector, “The Strength and Direction of Relationships Between Domestic and External Conflict and 
Cooperation: Syria, 1961-67,” (New York City: Paper prepared for delivery at the Sixty-fifth meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, September 2-6, 1969); Jonathan Wilkenfeld, “Domestic and Foreign 
Conflict Behavior of Nations,” Journal of Peace Research 5:1 (1968): 56-69. 
5
 Dahrendorf, Ralf, Class and Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,1959); Richard 
N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics; International Systems in Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1963). 
6
 Charles Ostrom and Brian L. Job, “The President and the Political Use of Force,” American Political Science 
Review 80 (1986): 541-566. 
7
 Patrick James and Athanasios Hristoulas, “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: Evaluating a Model of Crisis 
Activity for the United States,” The Journal of Politics 56:2 (1994): 327; B. Lian and J. R. O’Neal, “Presidents, the 
Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37:2 (1993): 277-300; Karl DeRouen, 
“The Indirect Link: Politics, The Economy and the Use of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39 (1995): 671-
695; Karl DeRouen Jr. and Jeffrey Peake, “The Dynamics of Diversion: The Domestic Implications of Presidential 
Use of Force,” International Interactions 28:2 (2002): 191-211. 
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Although it remains difficult to prove the diversionary intentions of political leaders today, and 
though the field itself has increasingly focused on American presidents and presidential use of 
force, diversionary theory of war has significant potential to explain the uses of force and the 
threat to use force by non-U.S. leaders. However, the theory necessitates some revisions in order 
to more comprehensively explain the domestic/foreign policy nexus. Particularly since the 
renaissance of the scholarship on diversionary theory of war in the post-Cold War era, the studies 
focus predominantly on U.S. presidents and, in some exceptional circumstances, on the use of 
force by other democratic Western countries. This not only puts significant limitations on 
possible cases of study, but also creates an almost methodological discrimination against more 
qualitative studies, such as those based on historical accounts, anecdotal knowledge from 
memoirs, and secondary sources. The subsequent section of this article will demonstrate how 
diversionary strategy is more frequently employed in world politics than assumed and, with some 
“friendly amendments”, this theory of war can be turned into a “a theory of foreign policy” that 
can be useful in understanding the sources of international conflict in other regions of the world. 
Before focusing on the use of diversionary strategies by Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, 
this article aims to revise and refine some basic premises of the classical diversionary theory of 
war and rescue the theory from the traditional focus on the United States.  
 
Theoretical Reformulations 
A Diversionary Theory of Foreign Policy? 
For many years, scholars investigated the diversionary motivations of leaders only when they use 
force against an external other. This not only created a reductionist approach in studying 
diversionary theory of war but also isolated diversionary theory from other foreign policy 
theories and approaches. This created several significant problems for the development of 
scholarship in this field. 
 
First, by focusing on the motivations of leaders only during times of war and armed conflict, 
scholars ignored other possible strategies for leaders to use foreign policy in order to distract 
attention away from domestic problems. However, public opinion literature provided ample 
studies on the rally effect of other forms of foreign policy actions on the approval ratings of 
leaders, but few scholars tried to integrate the findings of these two separate fields in their 
studies.8 Second, this reductionist approach also lead to the assumption that a lack of armed 
conflict or use of force meant that the decision of the president was unrelated to his domestic 
approval rating or the distraction of the domestic public. The neglect of this option created 
difficulties in understanding the real sources of international conflict.  
 
Many scholars in previous decades criticized this minimalist approach in diversionary studies 
and argued that a revision of dependent variables of diversionary theory was needed. For 
instance, prominent scholars of international relations, including Joe Hagan and Jack Levy, 
argued that leaders may sometimes resort to less risky options in order to distract the attention of 
                                                          
8
 Ann Fischback, Rivlin “The Diversionary Theory of Foreign Policy?: American Presidents and Public Opinion,” 
Dissertation (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan, 2008). This dissertation is a recent example of a study 
that takes into account diversion with cooperative foreign policy gestures.  
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the domestic public, as a means of avoiding long and costly wars.9 For Levy, these “actions short 
of war are generally more cost-effective in achieving the desired internal effect than an actual 
war.”10 Both Hagan and Levy suggested extending the scope of dependent variables in studies of 
diversionary theory of war in order to include other less costly and risky alternatives. Under such 
an interpretation, leaders could, in some instances, use the threat to use force instead of using 
force, or could engage in other diplomatic maneuvers, such as escalatory discourse or economic 
sanctions.  
 
Hagan and Levy were not alone in targeting the scope of dependent variables in diversionary 
studies. Following their studies, several other scholars, including Morgan and Bickers, also 
stressed the need to bring a more comprehensive perspective to the scholarship on diversionary 
theory of war. Until these studies, none of the well-known studies in the field focused on 
diversionary actions short of war. In addition to lower-level hostile actions short of war, Morgan 
and Bickers offered other, more peaceful options that could be used to divert the attention of the 
public away from domestic problems.11 Although other scholars—including Richards, Morgan, 
Wilson, Schwebach, and Young—later examined such strategies, there remained a shortage of 
empirical studies that tested the possibility of these uses to achieve the same goal.12 In one of the 
rare studies that considered these ‘more peaceful’ options, Rivlin argued that, in terms of U.S. 
foreign policy, the president could rally the public as the commander-in-chief and also as a 
peacemaker or diplomatic giant. She stated:  
 
“While scholars investigating this theory are correct that the president utilizing 
military troops potentially could result in a rallying of the population, they 
mistakenly ignore other roles the president can use to his advantage. In particular, 
it is possible that the position of the president as the chief diplomat and as the 
voice of the government to the people also can be utilized by the president to 
boost public opinion. Both these roles carry with them media attention and 
symbolic appeal and tend to be associated with non-conflictual activities such as 
speeches, trips, and negotiations.”13  
 
Given that the decision to use force is a foreign-policy decision and that leaders can substitute 
one foreign policy option over another depending on circumstances, a modification in the 
dependent variable of diversionary theory of war is necessary. Otherwise, the theory will fail to 
answer questions raised by scholars of foreign policy substitutability, including those of Most 
and Starr and Bennett and Nordstrom.14 Their studies indicated that leaders have different foreign 
                                                          
9
 Joe Hagan, “Domestic Political Conflict, Issue Areas, and Some Dimensions of Foreign Policy Behavior Other 
than Conflict,” International Interactions 12:4 (1986): 291-313. 
10
 Jack S. Levy, “Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook of War Studies 
(London: Unwin-Hyman, 1989), 281. 
11
 Clifton Morgan and Kenneth Bickers, “Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 36 (1992): 32.  
12
 Diana Richards, T. Clifton Morgans, Rick K. Wilson, Valerie L. Schwebach, and Garry D. Young, “Good Times, 
Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force A Tale of Some Not-So-Free Agents,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
37:3 (1993): 529.  
13
 Rivlin, “The Diversionary Theory of Foreign Policy,” 8.  
14
 Most and Starr described this foreign policy substitutability by raising two issues. First, they argued that, “through 
time and across space, similar factors could be plausibly be expected to trigger different foreign policy acts,” and 
second, “different processes could plausibly be expected to lead similar results.” According to them, “if foreign 
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policy actions at their disposal and, as such, can select any of these (depending on the 
circumstances and his/her cost benefit calculations) in order to reach the same goal. This would 
also mean that a leader could pick any of the diversionary strategies from his supply of foreign 
policy actions to reach the same goal of diverting the attention of the domestic public. If the 
single goal of the leader is diversion (assuming that the leader is a rational actor), then, in many 
instances, uses of force or declarations of war would not be the first option. In countries with 
domestic troubles especially, leaders—instead of a long, costly, and risky war that could entail 
many uncertainties—may prefer other alternatives and determine whether or not those actions 
are creating the desired result. For example, scholars of public opinion demonstrated that 
rhetorical escalations and foreign policy speeches can play important roles in increasing 
domestic support for the president and uniting the population behind him or her. These may also 
divert the attention of the domestic public by shifting political discussion and changing headlines 
for a temporary period of time.15 Considering foreign policy substitutability, the rationality of 
political leaders, and the availability of alternative strategies in the following case study, it will 
be shown that a leader can: 1) threaten to use force instead of engage in a military strike or war 
in order to deflect attention, and 2) revise the diversionary strategy that he/she is using if he/she 
believes that a previously used diversionary strategy is no longer creating the desired impact.  
 
Diversion in Countries other than the United States 
Another limitation of diversionary scholarship is the presence of American exceptionalism in the 
literature. As mentioned, diversionary theory, since its renaissance in the 1990s, has 
predominantly focused on U.S. presidents and how U.S. presidents externalize domestic political 
and economic problems through the use of force against other countries. Availability of 
quantitative data regarding presidential approval ratings and economic statistics, together with 
the use of force by U.S. president in these years, have made scholars in the field to focus more on 
presidential uses of force Due to burgeoning studies in the field, many scholars have begun to 
consider that the use of diversionary strategies is very much at the disposal of American 
presidents.16 According to Fordham, for example, the use of diversionary strategies is not a 
universal way of dealing with domestic problems; it is a particularity of the U.S. presidency.17 
 
Other than the availability of data and broadness of cases, what lead to this idea of “American 
exceptionalism” in the field was partly a result of the main assumptions of diversionary theory of 
war. In its original form, the leader who can engender the violent externalization of a domestic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
policies can indeed be alternative routes by which decision makers attain their goals, then it would seem plausible 
that decision makers who are confronted with some problem or subjected to some stimulus could, under at least 
certain conditions, substitute one such means for another”; Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, Inquiry, Logic, and 
International Politics (Columbia: University South Carolina Press, 1989); Also see D. Scott Bennet and Timothy 
Nordstrom, “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 44:1 (2000): 33. 
15
 For examples of these findings, see Michael MacKuen, “Political Drama, Economic Conditions, and the 
Dynamics of Presidential Popularity,” American Journal of Political Science 27 (1983): 165-192; Robin Marra, 
Charles W. Ostrom, and Dennis M. Simon, “Foreign Policy and Presidential Popularity Creating Windows of 
Opportunity in the Perpetual Election,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 34:4 (1990): 588-623; Brace, Paul and 
Barbara Hinckley, Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern Presidents (New York: Basic Books, 1992). 
16
 Benjamin O. Fordham, “Another Look at ‘Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force Abroad,’” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 46.4 (2002): 572-596. 
17
 Benjamin O. Fordham, “Strategic Conflict Avoidance and the Diversionary Use of Force,” The Journal of Politics 
67 (2005): 132-153. 
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conflict, without worsening domestic political and economic conditions, requires a powerful 
military. The results of an external strike need to be more or less foreseen by the leader, since the 
defeat of its forces may endanger the sovereignty of the country, and prolongation of war could 
worsen the leader’s domestic situation. Under these conditions, only the leaders of great powers 
seem to have the capability and opportunity to use force for diversionary purposes. This 
assumption, however, ignores the availability of alternative, less costly and risky strategies that 
the leader can utilize. Given the coincidence of the rise of diversionary scholarship in the 1990s 
with the unipolar international system—in which the U.S. is considered the sole global political, 
economic, and military power capable of projecting power in different parts of the world—the 
U.S. is deemed the only country that can execute such actions and bear the consequences (if any 
are to result). The Iraq War in 1991 demonstrated that, because of the revolution in military 
affairs, the U.S. was the only country capable of winning a short and decisive battle by means of 
its superior military capabilities, and in particular its air force. Thus, under these assumptions, 
U.S. presidents would be the only leaders capable of benefiting from a diversionary use of force 
without creating more political troubles domestically.  
 
A second argument for American preeminence in diversionary scholarship was an assumption 
regarding the relationship between regime type and expression of diversionary behavior. 
Although early studies in diversionary theory never differentiated between societies and regimes 
and their use of diversionary strategies, several scholars later began to focus on regime type as a 
significant determinant for these strategies. The predominant idea was that authoritarian leaders, 
due to their unlimited power and ability to suppress opposition against their regimes by use of 
force, would not need to use alternative manners of dealing with domestic problems and as a 
result, wouldn’t need to use diversionary strategies. Democratic leaders, on the other hand, were 
vulnerable to domestic opposition, since they 1) could not suppress the opposition as they 
wished, and 2) had electoral concerns. As a result, democratic leaders would search for options 
to distract public attention away from domestic problems and gain time—while the public was 
focusing on an external problem—to handle or resolve domestic problems.18 In fact, as stated by 
scholars like Clark, Fordham, and Nordstrom: 
 
“Democratic leaders are usually held to have fewer options than their authoritarian 
counterparts for dealing with unhappy citizens since autocrats can often repress, or 
control information in such a way that citizens do not necessarily blame the government 
for poor domestic circumstances. Further, democratic leaders are often presumed to have 
more autonomous control over foreign policy and the military than over domestic policy 
tools. In this light, it is not surprising that Gelpi goes so far as to call diversionary foreign 
policy “a pathology of democratic systems,” suggesting democratic leaders will succumb 
to the temptation of international violence when domestic trouble is brewing.”19 
 
This interpretation leads many in the field to ignore cases when authoritarian regimes use 
diversionary strategies, and instead focus on democratic countries. Alongside the initial 
assumption regarding military might, this theory on the regime type/diversionary strategy 
                                                          
18
 Christopher Gelpi, “Democratic Diversions Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic 
Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41:2 (1997): 255-282. 
19
 David Clark, Benjamin O. Fordham, and Timothy Nordstrom, “Preying on the Misfortune of Others: When Do 
States Exploit Their Opponents’ Domestic Troubles,” Journal of Politics 73:1 (2011): 252. 
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relation has, in fact, reinforced U.S. exceptionalism in diversionary theory of war. It is in some 
sense ironic that—despite significant cases of diversionary theory of war, such as the 
diversionary war launched by the Argentinian junta against Britain in the Falklands Islands and 
the Russian declaration of war against Japan in 1905—since the 1990s, even the possibility of 
use of force by authoritarian leaders has not been taken into consideration. 
 
Both of these assumptions portraying presidential use of force as strategically exceptional can be 
challenged. First, although American military power can be a significant factor in presidential 
uses of force, the availability of other, less risky and costly options makes it possible for leaders 
of other countries to utilize these strategies as well. As such, leaders of less prosperous countries 
with smaller armies could also employ less costly strategies and, instead of using force, could 
utilize some rhetorical assault against other countries to deflect the attention of domestic public. 
In addition, despite claims about the relationship between regime-type and use of diversionary 
strategies, studies on authoritarian regimes demonstrate that dictators are also sensitive to public 
opinion and try to know and follow what the public thinks about their actions. Moreover, 
although there are no elections in authoritarian regimes, leaders in these countries still have 
certain constituencies that they must take into account. In most instances, these are powerful 
stakeholders in the regime, such as politburo members and/or the military. Furthermore, studies 
demonstrate that most authoritarian leaders know that using force is not a viable long-term 
option, and thus need to determine complementing strategies to stay in power. As Kneur and 
others argue, using foreign policy is one of these options.20  
 
To sum up, as scholars like Weeks have emphasized, “[A]utocratic leaders, while they may exert 
enormous control over their subjects, are not usually immune from domestic threats to their 
tenure,” and “most authoritarian leaders require the support of domestic elites, who act as 
audiences in much the same way as voting publics in democracies.”21 In fact, some authoritarian 
leaders can be more vulnerable and dependent on the support of domestic audiences than is 
commonly assumed. When they experience this vulnerability, shifting the focus to foreign policy 
becomes a viable option.  
 
The literature is full of examples of authoritarian leaders using foreign policy for domestic 
purposes. Studies by historians and area studies experts on the Middle East, in particular, reveal 
several instances of leaders manipulating a foreign policy-related event in order to retain 
legitimacy and improve their standing in the country.22 Scholars, including Tessler and 
Grobschmidt and Perthes suggest that leaders in the Middle East utilize external threat and 
                                                          
20
 Kneur, Marianne, The Quest of Legitimacy: Foreign Policy as a Legitimation Strategy in Authoritarian Regimes 
(Sao Paulo: ISPA and ECPR Joint Conference, February 16-19, 2011). 
21
 Weeks, Jessica L., “Leaders, Accountability and Foreign Policy in Non-Democracies” Dissertation (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University, 2009). 
22
 For instance, Seale argues that Hafiz al-Assad of Syria also had concerns regarding the power of public opinion. 
According to Seale, Assad’s rule was not based on force alone, nor would it have survived had it been so. The factor 
of public approval was not negligible; in fact, Arab regimes such as his, so often derided as oriental despotisms, 
required a measure of popular consent. The importance of public opinion could be gauged by the strenuous efforts 
made to mobilize popular consent, by repeated exercises in public self-justification, and by strident media 
campaigns which rival Arab states waged against one another. Both the leaders and the led understood that once 
popular consent was withdrawn, the regime’s power diminished. Seale, Patrick. Asad of Syria: the Struggle for the 
Middle East (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1988), 178. 
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national security concerns in order to deflect attention away from domestic problems.23 
According to them, this maneuver has become a survival strategy for leaders in the region who 
face significant domestic political and economic challenges, and has been constantly and, in 
most instances successfully, utilized. Most of these accounts occur in presidential biographies, 
historical accounts, and memoirs. However, acquiring resources from such secondary sources 
necessitates a dialogue between diplomatic history, area studies, and scholarship on diversionary 
theory of war. As such, the following case study of Saddam Hussein’s use of diversionary 
strategies against other countries integrates the findings of diplomatic historians, area specialists, 
and diversionary scholars. Historical studies about the Gulf War and Saddam Hussein’s decision-
making during the conflict demonstrate that the current, data-driven nature of scholarship is 
partly responsible for the predominance of U.S. presidential action in the field. It is possible to 
overcome this problem, however, by effective use of data from other research mechanisms.  
 
The Gulf War and Saddam Hussein’s use of Diversionary Strategies 
The First Gulf War (following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces) and Saddam Hussein’s 
subsequent foreign policymaking provides an excellent case study to observe the diversionary 
foreign policy of a non-American, authoritarian leader facing significant domestic economic and 
political hardships. Iraqi foreign policy in the period between the end of Iran-Iraq War and the 
end of the Gulf War provides significant insight into the manner in which leaders can resort to 
multiple diversionary strategies. During these years, Iraq faced significant economic, political, 
and social challenges, and the government in Baghdad was, in most instances, incapable of 
responding to the people’s economic and political demands. Considering these difficulties, 
Saddam Hussein’s regime began utilizing diversionary strategies in order to temporarily divert 
the domestic public’s attention away from these problems. The rhetorical diversion that was 
launched by Saddam Hussein against the Gulf countries, Israel, and the West gradually turned 
into a diversionary use of force. In addition to the evolution of diversionary strategies, the target 
of diversionary strategy was also different: in more advanced stages of diversionary strategy, 
Saddam Hussein attempted to mobilize Arab nations as well as the Iraqi public. Although some 
diplomatic historians and experts of Iraqi politics documented these strategies without using the 
“diversionary theory of war,” most of Saddam’s policies fit very nicely within diversionary 
foreign policy. As such, the case demonstrates possible extensions of the dependent variable of 
studies on diversionary theory of war.  
 
Diversionary strategies are usually employed by political leaders of countries facing serious 
domestic problems, and in 1990, Iraq was facing many such problems. The economy of the 
country in particular was in ruins after the eight-year, extremely costly battle with Iran. The war 
devastated the normal functioning of the economy and created a major external debt problem, 
and bombings by the Iranian air force to Iraq’s industrial centers destroyed industry and 
infrastructure in the country. Not only did external debtors begin pressuring the Iraqi government 
to return their loans, but Iraqi citizens were also waiting for the economic rewards that Saddam 
                                                          
23
 Mark Tessler and Marilyn Grobschmidt, “Democracy in the Arab World and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” 
Democracy, War and Peace in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1995), 144; Volker Perthes, “Si Vis 
Stabilitatem, Para Bellum: State Building, National Security, and War Preparation in Syria,” in Steven Heydemann, 
(ed.), War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 
149-173, 159. 
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Hussein had promised over the course of those eight years. Negotiations for additional funds and 
efforts to reform the economy failed miserably in the last years of the 1980s. The rapid increase 
in unemployment after the demobilization of part of the Iraqi military was particularly 
concerning.  
 
Economic problems also brought with them significant social problems. The economic reforms 
gave rise to black markets, and high increases in price fueled social anger towards the 
government. The formation of small-scale demonstrations in Baghdad demonstrated how social 
resentment began to surpass the fear threshold among the Iraqi public and illustrated the first 
such reaction against Saddam Hussein after he assumed power. In addition, Shia groups in the 
south of the country, which constituted more than 60 percent of the population, and Kurdish 
insurgence in the north continued to constitute a major threat for the country’s political stability 
and territorial integrity. Furthermore, the international atmosphere did nothing to help Saddam 
Hussein. It was a sensitive time for authoritarian regimes worldwide, due to the end of the Cold 
War and the fall of communist totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in Central and Eastern 
Europe, most of which had been natural allies of the Iraqi regime for decades. In particular, the 
overthrow and public execution of Nicolae Ceausescu created major concerns among 
authoritarian rulers in the Middle East. Following the event, Saddam Hussein asked his security 
officials to study the case in Romania to avoid similar consequences in Iraq. 
 
According to scholars like Chaudhry, the situation in Iraq in 1990 was so grave that “not even 
the experienced repressive apparatus of the Ba’ath Party could guarantee domestic political 
stability.”24 In addition to demonstrations and increasing levels of social unrest, Saddam Hussein 
also began being challenged by people within his own inner circle. For the first time in his 
presidency, Saddam Hussein faced three assassination attempts between the end of the war with 
Iran and the Gulf Crisis.25 
 
Saddam Hussein knew that there was no quick fix to the problems he encountered. 
Reconstruction after the war, economic reforms, and social stability would take significant time, 
and resentment against his rule was growing steadily. In the midst of these difficulties, he had 
two options: either suppress the opposition within the country and use an iron fist to silence 
social resentment, or divert the attention of the domestic public. Although he successfully 
implemented this strategy numerous times—contributing to his moniker as the “strong man of 
Baghdad”—his previous experience during the pre-Bath period made him recognize that 
suppression could, in some instances, backfire and create further resistance to his rule. Bath 
resistance against the Iraqi regime survived, despite suppression and political repression for 
decades, and ultimately led to an overthrow of power. In fact, as stated by Karsh and Rautsi:  
 
“It had been evident to him, from early on, that even the least democratic form of 
government required substantial popular support… He knew that a regime ruling 
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at the points of bayonets was condemned to a precarious existence, and bound to 
come to an abrupt end.”26 
 
Because of this, Hussein required an alternative that could be periodically substituted with 
repression.  
 
This second option was to temporarily divert the attention of the domestic public and create a 
‘rally around the flag’ effect. Shifting the attention of the domestic public away from domestic 
economic and social problems would allow him time to either consolidate his rule and suppress 
more efficiently, or find a resolution to the problem. In both instances, however, he would be 
able to save face against domestic pressures. The issue that he would use as a diversionary tool 
could distract the public attention and make them delay or forget their “less existential” demands 
and objections. In an artificially manufactured external crisis, Saddam Hussein would have a 
chance to ask for further sacrifice and generosity from his people, while unifying them for a 
single goal.  
 
Like other Middle Eastern leaders, Saddam Hussein also used these diversionary mechanisms 
during his political career. He frequently utilized a foreign policy event or issue to either 
legitimize his purge campaigns and unify Iraqi society behind him, or divert the society’s 
attention away from domestic problems. According to Karsh and Rautsi, this strategy provided 
“an outlet for frustration.”27 In most instances, this strategy worked in Hussein’s favor and 
helped him consolidate his power in Iraq.  
 
When domestic problems started to emerge in Iraq in 1990, Saddam once again began to employ 
diversionary strategies. After the failure of the economic reforms, Saddam turned to external 
factors to offer reasons for the domestic problems. Such scapegoating was frequently used 
throughout the Iran-Iraq War. As of the 1990s, the most important source of Iraq’s economic 
problems, according to Saddam, was not the war or the failure of his economic policies, but the 
Kuwaiti government and its policies. For Saddam, Kuwait was waging an economic war against 
the Iraqi government with the intention of destroying it. Although scholars of diversionary 
studies neglect this incident in their research, scholars of Iraqi politics indicate that Saddam’s 
increasingly harsh discourse towards Kuwait and Gulf sheikdoms was an attempt to deflect the 
Iraqi people’s attention from the country’s domestic problems. According to Long, for example, 
under difficult domestic economic and political challenges, Saddam started to look for an 
exterior crisis with which to replace the war in Iran. This crisis would, on the one hand, divert 
the attention away from these domestic problems and, on the other hand, justify the continuation 
of active military service in the country. As a result, Saddam could incite compliance for yet 
another existential external threat to the survival of his country.28 Kuwait provided an excellent 
opportunity for Saddam Hussein and a very effective source of diversion. Karsh and Rautsi, 
historians of the Gulf War, make note of Saddam’s intention to scapegoat Kuwait in their 
studies. According to them:  
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“In the summer of 1988 Iran was debilitated; Iraq’s military power was greater 
than ever, having steadily expanded during the war. In Tehran an agonizing 
reckoning was already under way; in Baghdad millions were dancing on the 
streets.  
Yet not even such euphoric circumstances would lure a professional survivor like 
Hussein into a false sense of security. He had no illusions, whatsoever, realizing 
that the celebrations would give way to a hangover; that a bill for the dislocations 
of the war would be presented in one form or another. He knew that even in the 
most repressive police state there are limits to what people are willing to endure 
or the sacrifices they are prepared to make. The removal of the Iranian threat, the 
main factor cementing Iraqi society during the war years, generated an urgent 
need for new means of rallying public support and enthusiasm behind Saddam.”29 
 
It is not very easy for leaders to mobilize their societies against an external enemy in the absence 
of any social and political resentment towards that country; instead, the externalization works 
when the society is ready to rally behind the leader due to the existence of previously formed 
anger towards another state. Kuwait, at the beginning of the Gulf War, was a state that could 
serve Saddam’s diversionary purposes. There had already been historical conflict between 
Kuwait and Iraq, ever since the emergence of the independent state of Kuwait. Former leaders of 
the country, prior to Saddam Hussein, had claimed that Kuwait actually belonged to Iraq. The 
source of the claim was the historical boundaries established during the Ottoman Empire. By 
then, the territories of Kuwait were within the Basra province, and because the Basra province 
became one of the three provinces that formed Iraq, Kuwait’s standing as territory carved from 
Basra created resentment among the Iraqi people. Moreover, there were several other territorial 
conflicts between Iraq and Kuwait, which included the Rumaliyah oilfields and the Bubiyan and 
Warbah islands. Furthermore, the economic stability and richness of the Gulf States, including 
Kuwait, had always been a source of resentment among other Arab countries. All of these 
conditions made it easy for Saddam Hussein to mobilize his people against Kuwait. 
 
There was a problem, however, for Saddam Hussein’s use of Kuwait as a diversionary target. 
Despite existing resentment in some segments of Iraqi society against Kuwait, it would be highly 
improper for a leader like Saddam Hussein, who had claims for potential leadership of the Arab 
world, to attack to a weaker Arab state. This would greatly tarnish his image as a leader of pan-
Arabism, who fought eight years against Iran in order to protect the spread of Iranian 
revolutionarism to other Arab countries, and be considered a betrayal of the non-aggression 
norms of the Arab League. Although the Iraqi people may have welcomed such a rhetorical 
escalation, Arabs in other parts of the Middle East may have perceived the action differently.  
 
Considering these impediments and possibilities, Saddam attempted to link the conflict in 
Kuwait to a more Arab-wide struggle. An escalation with Kuwait could only rally the Iraqi 
public, but a rhetorical escalation toward Western powers could mobilize broader Arab support. 
As a result, Saddam Hussein, in the very early days of the Gulf Crisis, began to link the bilateral 
tensions between Iraq and Kuwait to an external plot to overthrow the government and destroy 
Iraq. Saddam claimed that problems in the Iraqi economy, which were seemingly domestic in 
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nature, were related to schemes by external forces.30 Although Kuwait was waging an economic 
war against Iraq, it was ultimately a tool of the enemy imperialist forces to destroy the country as 
a whole.  
 
An early indication of Saddam Hussein’s intention to use this strategy were his speeches 
delivered throughout the 1990s. He constantly highlighted threats from outside forces to the 
security of the Arab world and especially preferred to use regional forums in order to relay his 
message. Saddam Hussein always believed that rhetorical escalation towards the “others” of the 
Middle East could serve as an excellent method of mobilizing Arab nations, building stature, and 
diverting attention away from other problems. Depending on the context, these “others” include 
Iran, Israel, and Western countries. Such rhetorical attacks were widely publicized among the 
Arab people in the Middle East and, in some instances, provided high esteem and support for 
Saddam Hussein.  
 
While using this assertive and aggressive discourse, however, Saddam was also trying to prevent 
backlash from Western countries and reassure them that these maneuvers were carried out only 
for domestic consumption. In particular, he tried to reassure decision-makers in Washington 
about the domestic nature of his speeches.31 An important account of this strategy reportedly took 
place during his meeting with Prince Bandar after his speech against Israel. According to Bob 
Woodward, in responding to question from Prince Bandar, Saddam Hussein explained the nature 
of the speech in the following manner: 
 
“…[Y]ou must understand the context in which it had been made... it had been 
delivered to members of the armed forces at a public forum where emotions were 
running high, with people clapping and screaming. As we both know, it never 
hurts in the Arab world to threaten Israel, so I had done it.”32 
 
In this way, Saddam was ensuring that Washington understood that he had no intention of 
attacking Israel:  
 
“I want to assure President Bush and His Majesty King Fahd that I will not attack 
Israel” Saddam stressed…“Do you want us to mention this to Bush as our 
observation?” Bandar asked, “Or is it a message from you to President Bush?” 
“It’s a message from me to President Bush” Saddam replied.33 
 
In the same conversation, after a pause, he once again turned back to Bandar’s question about his 
speech against Israel: 
 
“Saddam then turned to justifying his verbal assaults on Israel, though he 
continued giving assurances that he would not attack the Jewish state. Israel was 
the natural lightning rod for creating a crisis atmosphere, he said. It had been two 
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years since the Iran-Iraq cease-fire, and the Iraqi people were getting relaxed. “I 
must whip them into a sort of frenzy or emotional mobilization so they will be 
ready for whatever may happen.”34 
 
Although there is no way to confirm the accuracy of this account, it still demonstrates how 
diversionary foreign policy (short of war) could be utilized by the leaders of authoritarian 
countries. Saddam Hussein, while assuring his Western counterparts about the domestic nature of 
his speeches, was continuing and even escalating this tone throughout the 1990s.  
 
In the meantime, the confrontation between Iraq and Kuwait was reaching a tipping point. 
Saddam Hussein frequently linked his rhetorical escalation to the crisis between the two 
countries, in order to gain the support of the Arab people. Much to the surprise of many in the 
region, on August 1, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. According to Coughlin, though Hussein 
did not expect any plaudits for his move, neither did he expect such large-scale international 
reaction to the invasion. After his meeting with April Glaspie, the ambassador of the United 
States in Baghdad, Saddam Hussein sensed invading Kuwait would not be a problem. However, 
a few days after invasion, the U.S. and Soviet Union issued a joint declaration of condemnation 
of the move. Subsequently, the United Nations Security Council convened and passed a 
resolution condemning the invasion and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops. 
Meanwhile, the Saudi regime accepted the United States’ offer to protect Saudi Arabia from a 
possible Iraqi attack, and an international coalition began to form under the leadership of the 
United States. Saddam Hussein suddenly and unintentionally caused the West to deploy 
hundreds of thousands of troops to the Arabian Peninsula for the first time in decades. 
 
Saddam Hussein was additionally shaken by the resolutions of the Arab League and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council condemning Iraqi actions, as his leadership claim to the Arab world had 
been irreparably damaged. Worsening his status further, the Arab League passed another 
resolution—the first ever resolution of its kind—allowing for the dispatch of troops as part of the 
multinational force. The Arab League summit revealed the increasing isolation of Hussein’s 
regime from the Arab regional order. Saddam’s only hope was to mobilize the Arab masses 
against their governments’ support for the anti-Iraq international coalition. Through this strategy, 
he expected Arab citizens to pressure their governments into withdrawing their forces, or even 
overthrow them. To achieve this, Saddam escalated his diversionary strategy so that Israel and 
Western countries would receive more attention, simultaneously trying to divert the attention of 
the Arab public away from his invasion of Kuwait. In fact, as stated by Karsh and Rautsi: 
 
“With the summit revealing an unbridgeable gap with other Arab regimes, 
Saddam sought to undermine them by rallying masses behind his cause by 
Zionizing the crisis. By linking his Kuwaiti venture to the Palestinian problem, he 
hoped to portray himself as the champion of the Pan-Arab cause, thereby 
eradicating any conceivable opposition to his move in the Arab world. If the 
‘restoration of Kuwait to the motherland’ was the first step towards ‘the liberation 
of Jerusalem’, how could any Arab leader be opposed to it? The aggressor would 
be transformed into a liberator and a hero.”35 
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A declaration of war against Israel by Iraq was unrealistic in 1990. After the eight-year war with 
Iran and an economy in ruins, Saddam Hussein likely understood that starting another costly and 
possibly long war with Israel was not in his best interest. As a result, Saddam instead tried to link 
the emerging international coalition in Saudi Arabia to the state of Israel. For instance, he 
suggested that Israeli pilots, disguised as Americans, had been deployed in Saudi Arabia. 
Although coalition forces and Saudi officials denied this accusation, Saddam Hussein continued 
his allegations about Israeli contributions to the war efforts.36  
 
Possibly the most significant attempt to redirect attention away from the invasion of Kuwait to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict came on August 12th, with the formal initiation of linkage politics. 
Saddam’s initial statements against Israel and Western forces struck a chord among the Arab 
people and more strongly highlighted the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Amid international 
and regional pressures to withdraw from Kuwait, Saddam Hussein initiated a new diversionary 
maneuver by proposing a withdrawal plan—a three-point peace initiative—that primarily aimed 
at linking the invasion of Kuwait to other conflicts in the region and purported to “solve” all 
problems of territorial disputes: 
 
“I propose that all issues of occupation in the region, and that which had been 
misrepresented as occupation, be solved in accordance with the same standard, 
principles, and premises laid down by the UN Security Council…First, to make 
ready withdrawal arrangements according to the same principles for the 
immediate unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Arab territories 
in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, and for the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, 
and for the withdrawal of troops on the Iraq-Iran front, and to make arrangements 
for the status of Kuwait.”37  
 
While the White House and other capitals promptly rejected the proposal as an attempt to shift 
attention, the reaction among Arabs was more ambivalent. For some, including certain segments 
of Palestinians, the proposal was extremely appealing.38 In several different Arab capitals, 
demonstrations were organized as a show of support for the proposal, which transformed into 
support for Saddam Hussein. 
 
After witnessing early signs of this support, Saddam began referencing Palestine in his addresses 
and invited Yasser Arafat to Baghdad to meet and extend support for the Palestinian cause. 
Despite his insistence on the use of diversionary messages, however, demonstrations did not 
evolve into popular revolutions to overthrow Arab leaders and stop their support for the 
international coalition. In November 1990, the UN Security Council passed another resolution, 
giving Iraq a withdrawal deadline of January 15, 1991, and in the event of defiance, authorized 
all necessary means to implement Resolution 660.  
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Following the resolution, Saddam Hussein intensified his references to Palestine and Jerusalem. 
In his famous speech, “Mother of All Battles,” he stated:  
 
“Then the door will be wide open for the liberation of beloved Palestine, 
Lebanon, and the Golan. The Jerusalem and the Dome of the Rock will be 
released from the bondage.”39 
 
The speech was made several days before the withdrawal deadline. Following these statements, 
Saddam, in a final attempt to divert the attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict, attacked Israel using 
SCUD missiles. This was a revision of rhetorical diversion to a more action-based diversionary 
strategy. Instead of threatening to use force, Saddam began actively using force to reach the 
same goal. He also already knew that there would be no retaliation from Israel, and that the 
attacks were expected to be conducted from Saudi territory. Moreover, striking Israel would not 
bring any strategic military advantage to Iraq. However, Saddam Hussein was aware of possible 
subsequent support of the action from the Arab masses.  
 
Diplomatic historians and experts on Iraqi politics interpreted the attacks as diversionary in 
nature. For instance, Jerrold Post evaluated Hussein’s policies during the Gulf War in the 
following way: 
 
“What began as an act of naked aggression toward Kuwait was transformed into 
the defining drama of his life. Although he had previously showed little concern 
for Palestinian people, the shrewdly manipulative Saddam had wrapped himself 
and his invasion of Kuwait in the Palestinian Flag.”40 
 
For James Piscatori on the other hand, the broader goal was not only to mobilize the Iraqi people 
or the Arab masses, but the whole of the Muslim world. According to him:  
  
“When Saddam Hussein launched his initiative of August 12th explicitly linking 
his withdrawal from Kuwait with Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, 
he was exploiting the profound sentiment that had become the Arab—and the 
Muslim—consensus. It was on one level, an obvious political ploy, a cost free 
way of attempting to divert attention. He appeared to strike a blow for Palestinian 
liberation without doing a great deal to accomplish it. But by explicitly shifting 
focus to the Arab-Israeli conflict and restoring the question of Palestine to pride 
of place, he was on another level, tapping into deep springs of Muslim concern.”41 
 
Through the use of these different mechanisms, Saddam Hussein demonstrated that diversionary 
foreign policy is not a sole maneuver, but can be revised and modified according to the 
circumstances. He used multiple diversionary strategies over a short period of time and escalated 
the tone of diversionary rhetoric or action when he deemed it necessary. 
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Alternative Explanations? 
Although there is a general consensus among scholars of Iraqi politics that Saddam Hussein’s 
Gulf War policies were intended to divert the attention of the Arab public and rally them around 
his leadership, there are alternative explanations for Saddam’s actions offered by some. One of 
the most popular explanations pertains to Saddam’s intention of genuinely becoming the new 
Saladin of the Arab world.42 This explanation, however, misses an important point about the 
capability of the Iraqi government after its eight-year war in Iran and the situation of Iraqi 
economy, which demonstrate that the country could not afford another costly war. In addition, 
Saddam’s politics were not greatly concerned with the Palestinian issue, as the Iranian threat was 
most critical to Iraqi security. In previous conflicts between Arabs and Israelis, the Iraqi 
government did not provide active support for the warring Arab countries. During the 1973 War, 
for example, Iraq was only marginally involved and sent a symbolic number of troops to the 
Syria-Israel border. This policy of conflict avoidance created a major rift between Syria and Iraq. 
As a result, Bashar al-Assad refused to support Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and claimed that 
war with Iran would not only damage the anti-Israeli bloc in the Middle East, but also divert 
Arab resources away from the more imminent threat—a Israel.  
 
Moreover, although Yasser Arafat was invited to Baghdad and provided support for Saddam 
Hussein, Saddam had never been on good terms with the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) and its leaders. During the “Black September”, for example, he did not want to intervene 
in Jordan to help Palestinian refugees. Further, during the oil boom years when the Iraqi 
economy was growing, he excluded Palestinians from coming to work in Iraq.43 In most of the 
1980s, Saddam supported Abu Nidal, who had allegedly assassinated important PLO leaders 
such as Abu Iyad.44 Due to this political history, Saddam’s policies regarding Palestine during 
the Gulf War likely only had diversionary goals.  
 
Conclusion 
The diversionary theory of war has been one of the most debated theories in the interactions of 
domestic politics and foreign policy. This study intended to extend the scope of the theory to 
include different forms of diversionary strategies by a non-American leader, as well as instances 
where a single leader uses multiple divisionary strategies over a short period of time. It also 
aimed to revise the diversionary theory of war, rescue it from the constraints of the use of force, 
and integrate it with different theories on the public opinion and foreign policy nexus.  
 
As discussed, Saddam Hussein’s use of diversionary strategies during the Gulf Crisis provides 
important insights into the politics of the Middle East and the diversionary theory of war. 
Saddam Hussein’s use of diversionary strategies demonstrates that leaders of states other than 
the U.S. are also able to employ maneuvers to deflect public attention away from domestic 
problems. Although the existence of a powerful army and sufficient economic resources may 
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provide a comparative advantage to leaders of great powers in using diversionary war and 
military strikes, the availability of less costly and less risky diversionary options allows leaders 
of other states to employ these strategies as well. In the case of the Gulf Crisis, the relative 
success of rhetorical diversion illustrates that the threat to use force can also have a rallying 
effect on a society.  
 
Saddam’s success also demonstrates that not only elected democratic officials, but also 
authoritarian leaders can employ these strategies. Although Saddam Hussein had total control of 
all coercive mechanisms of the state to suppress or punish oppositional movements, he still 
believed that it was vital to ensure the support of the people in order to effectively remain in 
power. As a result, he attempted to maintain the support of the Iraqi people as well as the Arab 
masses active to his war efforts.  
 
Finally, the case of Saddam Hussein’s use of multiple diversionary strategies demonstrates that 
leaders pay attention to incoming information, evaluate different options, and subsequently select 
the appropriate diversionary foreign policy. When leaders employ diversionary strategies, they 
prefer to follow the reactions of the public and shape their diversionary tactics in accordance 
with these reactions, and they are able to modify and revise their strategies after evaluating 
positive or negative attitudes toward these policies. Saddam Hussein, for example, gradually 
intensified his tone as a result of the relative success of his actions. As he observed the Arab 
people beginning to oppose the policies of their own governments and launch campaigns to stop 
their governments’ support of the U.S.-led international coalition, he maintained, and even 
intensified, his attacks against Israel.  
 
Together, these findings demonstrate that the diversionary use of foreign policy is not a 
particularity of U.S. foreign policy but is, in a broader sense, a theory of domestic politics and 
foreign policy interaction. The availability of less costly diversionary strategies for political 
leaders shows that leaders of less resourceful countries may also employ this strategy when they 
confront domestic problems. Moreover, depending on the level of support that they create, 
leaders may utilize multiple strategies gradually or at the same time. These findings offer an 
important approach for future studies regarding diversionary foreign policy in non-U.S. 
countries.  
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